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1. Introduction  
 
Understanding and also examining the strategies of the US endowment funds is of 
fundamental relevance to investors for several reasons. US endowment funds achieved over 
the last years consistently superior investment returns, especially those with assets larger 
than $ 10 bn, comprising Yale, Harvard, Texas, Stanford and Princeton University. Until 
2007 they achieved an average 10 year annualized return of about 15%, which lies about 7% 
higher than the return of a traditional 50% bond and 50% equity portfolio at much lower risk 
level.1  
 
Universities show in comparison to other (also institutional) investors some special 
characteristics:  
• Universities live forever, e.g. they do not have the typical life cycle and so the have 
theoretically an infinite investment horizon.2 
• It seems that university endowments are relying more on asset allocation than other 
(institutional) investors3, this can be seen as well in the exposure to multiple asset 
classes. Endowment funds usually have a stable asset allocation over time and a long-
term investment horizon. Lower trading costs occur due to the lower reliance on market 
timing for generating the investment returns.4 
• Universities have access to the latest portfolio optimization theories5 and furthermore 
they have also the knowledge to apply these theories.  
• Endowment funds enjoy tax relieves6 and in addition they get in pleasure of fewer 
regulatory constraints on their investments7.  
• Universities receive donations from other external sources and moreover it is generally 
legally forbidden for them to spend more than their return on investments. So when 
analyzing university endowment funds the overall fund size can be seen as an exogenous 
variable.8 
                                                 
1 cp. Frontier Capital Management (2007), page 1  
2 cp. e.g. Dimmock (2007), page 2 or Brown, Garlappi, Tiu (2008), page 2  
3 cp. Brown, Garlappi, Tiu (2008), page 2  
4 cp. Frontier Capital Management (2007), page 2  
5 cp. Brown, Garlappi, Tiu (2008), page 2  
6 cp. Dimmock (2007), page 2  
7 cp. Brown, Garlappi, Tiu (2008), page 2  
8 cp. Dimmock (2007), page 2  
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• Universities have very simple spending rules, where usually only a small contingent of 
the assets is expended, which leads to a smaller asset-liability-management-problem.9 
2. Review of US endowment funds  
 
2.1. Overview about the largest US-endowments  
The US endowment funds are non-taxable vehicles, which were founded to support and 
manage funding requirements of universities and colleges. The funding consists of a 
combination of gifts, legacies and investment returns. In the United States there exist over 
700 endowments with an average fund of about $ 521 million10, whereas in the United 
Kingdom the endowment funds cannot compete with the large US endowment funds. In the 
UK for example the Cambridge University (by the way the largest endowment fund in 
Europe) had an endowment fund of $ 1,797 million11 in July 2008, whereas Harvard (the 
largest endowment fund in the US) had an endowment fund of $ 36,556 million.  
 
The existence of university endowment funds is especially in the United States very 
distributed. The university endowment funds are a good possibility for the university of 
receiving stable returns for their operating management. NACUBO, the National Association 
of College and University Business Officers, reports at regular intervals the most important 
data about the endowment funds. Universities usually have their fiscal year beginning at the 
1st of July and ending at the 30th of June and that is the reason why most data here is stated as 
of the end of June and for most university endowments (as Yale) the data for the financial 
year 2009 is not yet available.  
 
Here is an extract of the 20 largest universities from the NACUBO report with the largest 
endowment funds concerning market value. As the fiscal year for universities usually lasts 
till the end of June the data for 2009 is not yet available, as NACUBO has to collect all the 
data, so the following information is based on fiscal year 2008.  
 
                                                 
9 cp. Brown, Garlappi, Tiu (2008), page 2  
10 cp. 2008 NACUBO Endowment Study, © 2009 National Association of College and University Business 
Officers, All Institutions Listed by Fiscal Year 2008 Market Value of Endowment Assets with Percentage 
Change Between 2007 and 2008 Endowment Assets  
11 cp. The Guardian December 2008, Crisis blows £250m hole in university funding, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2008/dec/12/oxford-university-funding-credit-crunch  
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All Institutions Listed by Fiscal Year 2008 Market Value of Endowment Assets 
with Percentage Change Between 2007 and 2008 Endowment Assets 
Rank  Institution State 
2008  
Endowment  
Funds  
($000)  
2007  
Endowment  
Funds  
($000)  
*Percentage  
Change in  
Endowment  
(2008 - 
2007)  
1  Harvard University MA 36,556,284 34,634,906 5.5% 
2  Yale University CT 22,869,700 22,530,200 1.5% 
3  Stanford University CA 17,200,000 17,164,836 0.2% 
4  Princeton University NJ 16,349,329 15,787,200 3.6% 
5  University of Texas 
System TX 16,111,184 15,613,672 3.2% 
6  Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology MA 10,068,800 9,980,410 0.9% 
7  University of Michigan MI 7,571,904 7,089,830 6.8% 
8  Northwestern University IL 7,243,948 6,503,292 11.4% 
9  Columbia University NY 7,146,806 7,149,803 0.0% 
10  The Texas A&M University 
System and Foundations TX 6,659,352 6,590,300 1.0% 
11  University of Chicago IL 6,632,311 6,204,189 6.9% 
12  
University of 
Pennsylvania 
PA 6,233,281 6,635,187 -6.1% 
13  University of Notre Dame IN 6,225,688 5,976,973 4.2% 
14  University of California CA 6,217,340 6,439,436 -3.4% 
15  Duke University NC 6,123,743 5,910,280 3.6% 
16  Emory University GA 5,472,528 5,561,743 -1.6% 
17  Cornell University NY 5,385,482 5,247,097 2.6% 
18  Washington University MO 5,350,470 5,567,843 -3.9% 
19  Rice University TX 4,610,164 4,669,544 -1.3% 
20  University of Virginia VA 4,572,613 4,370,209 4.6% 
Table 1: Overview about the largest US endowment funds12 
 
                                                 
12 cp. 2008 NACUBO Endowment Study, © 2009 National Association of College and University Business 
Officers, All Institutions Listed by Fiscal Year 2008 Market Value of Endowment Assets with Percentage 
Change Between 2007 and 2008 Endowment Assets  
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*According to NACUBO the "percentage change" does not mean the rate of return on 
investment for the stated endowment. This figure tells the endowment's change from the 
market value between the fiscal year 2007 and the fiscal year 2008 (always fiscal year end). 
Factors such as the growth from gifts, reductions from expenditures and withdrawals, and 
investment returns have an impact on the fiscal year end market value of an endowment. As 
the fiscal year ends in June for universities, there is a time lag concerning the publication of 
their data. Unfortunately there is no information about the performance and asset allocation 
of university endowment funds available yet.  
 
As one can see in table 1, the big players in the endowment business are the universities of 
Yale and Harvard, which will be also described and explained later on. The US endowment 
funds reported over the last years considerable investment returns, however now during the 
financial crisis also the universities are affected.  
 
        
 Figure 1: Total AuM of US endowment funds  Figure 2: Total AuM of US endowment funds  
 vs. S&P 500 Index (absolute performance)13 vs. S&P 500 Index (relative performance)14  
 
In the first figure one can see the total assets under management (AuM) of the universities 
reported by NACUBO in comparison to the absolute performance of the S&P 500 Index. 
One can see clearly the similar movements, especially when the financial crisis started. 
However, in the second figure, the relative performance starting at 100 at the 30th of June 
2001, one can see that although the universities were criticized and debated a lot with their 
"aggressive asset allocation"15, they still considerably outperformed the S&P 500 Index at 
any time between June 2001 and November 2008. Although they were affected by the credit 
crunch, they still did a good job and outperformed other institutions.  
 
                                                 
13 cp. NACUBO (2002-2008) and Bloomberg  
14 cp. NACUBO (2002-2008) and Bloomberg  
15 cp. Handelsblatt (March 2009)  
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The interims report of NACUBO, which deals with the first half of the financial year 2009, 
reported a decline in endowments of 22% (in the same period the S&P 500 Index fell 
29%).16 Nevertheless, the university endowment funds showed considerable returns during 
the last years and the losses in 2008 and 2009 only showed the impact of the financial crisis 
and that no one was immune against the credit crunch.  
 
                                                 
16 cp. NACUBO (2008), page 1  
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2.2. The endowment fund investment process  
For getting a better understanding for endowment funds, I want to deal with the typical 
endowment fund investment process. In the typical endowment fund investment process 
decisions of both, internal and external personnel are comprised, which makes it a 
decentralized management problem.17  
 
Figure 3: The typical endowment fund investment process18 
 
The investment decision process consists usually of three major tasks, (i) the strategic asset 
class allocation, (ii) the tactical asset allocation across asset classes and finally (iii) the 
security selection within the asset classes. The two main internal parties involved are the 
university/endowment board and the investment committee/company. As external personnel 
we can have on the one hand the consultants and on the other hand the portfolio sub-
managers as involved personnel.  
 
Usually the board of trustees or regents has the ultimate fiduciary and custodial 
responsibility over the endowment's assets and the governing body. The main task of the 
board is the development of the investment policy, which tells one everything about the 
                                                 
17 cp. Barry and Starks (1984) and van Binsbergen, Brandt and Koijen (2006).  
18 Brown, Garlappi, Tiu (2008), page 36 and 51  
and Swensen (2000) and Acharya and Dimson (2007)  
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guidelines, objectives and also the constraints under which the assets can be invested. An 
important feature of the policy statement is the determination of allowable asset classes, that 
can be held in the endowment portfolio and furthermore the benchmark decision for each 
asset class and also the allowable tactical allocation range.19 More detailed information about 
asset allocation in university endowment funds will be discussed later on.  
 
Setting high-level policies is the task of the entire board, whereas the board is usually not 
involved with the endowment day-to-day management decisions. Therefore is either the 
investment committee or a formally constituted investment company responsible. The 
investment committee could be made of a sub-committee of board members with assistance 
of volunteer or paid non-board members. The investment company, like the University of 
Texas Investment Management Company or the Harvard Management Company, has to 
report directly to the board. The investment committee or company is responsible for 
implementing the board's policies in the fund's portfolio and furthermore for several specific 
decisions concerning investments, which are categorized in tactical asset allocation decisions 
(across the universe of approved asset classes) and security selection within each asset class. 
Brown, Garlappi and Tiu (2008) pointed also another interesting aspect out, namely that it is 
quite common for the investment committee's internal staff delegating the ongoing 
maintenance and the initial formation of each asset class-specific portfolios to groups of 
external portfolio-managers.20  
The NACUBO survey report from 2005 examined that on average external portfolio 
managers controlled about 90.4% of the total assets hold by the comprised endowment 
funds.21  
 
Usually NACUBO divides the endowment assets into six classes: 
• Endowment assets greater than $ 1 billion  
• Endowment assets between $ 500 million and $ 1 billion  
• Endowment assets between $ 100 million and $ 500 million  
• Endowment assets between $ 50 million and $ 100 million  
• Endowment assets between $ 25 million and $ 50 million  
• Endowment assets less than or equal to $ 25 million  
 
                                                 
19 cp. Brown, Garlappi, Tiu (2008), page 36  
20 cp. Brown, Garlappi, Tiu (2008), page 36  
21 cp. NACUBO survey report (2005), page 32  
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For larger endowments the statistic concerning control of external portfolio managers is 
slightly lower, at about 86.3% of the assets in endowments with assets under management in 
excess of $ 1 bn.22 One will also see in the following examples that there is always a 
considerable difference between larger and smaller endowment funds, possible explanations 
therefore will be stated later on.  
 
However, this high percentage tells us that usually the investment committees delegate the 
security selection process in traditional (e.g. fixed-income, public equity) and alternative 
asset classes (e.g. real estate, hedge funds, private equity) to external, professional portfolio-
managers, who are not directly employed by the board. As a consequence, although it is kind 
of a convenience to suggest that the security selection decisions are made by the committee's 
investment staff, in reality it is much more accurate to tag the choice they face as manager 
selection problem, that means also all the entailing principal-agent conflicts such a 
relationship denotes.23  
 
 
 
                                                 
22 cp. Brown, Garlappi, Tiu (2008), page 37  
23 cp. Brown, Garlappi, Tiu (2008), page 37  
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2.3. Spending policy  
The endowment funds provide the universities the possibility of stable returns and money to 
invest for the university's current operations. Each university has a spending policy, stating 
the rules for the different spending rates for them, which is calculated by dividing the dollars 
spent from the endowment with the beginning market value of the endowment.24 An 
example for a spending policy and also how the Yale university invests the money from the 
endowment will be stated in the second part of my paper.  
 
Endowment 
assets  2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 
 N=772 N=776 N=769 N=756 N=738 N=718 N=700 N=693 N=668 N=633 
Greater than 
$ 1 bn 4.3% 4.4% 4.6% 4.7% 5.2% 5.3% 4.9% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 
> $ 500 mn 
to <= $ 1 bn  4.4% 4.4% 4.5% 4.8% 5.2% 5.3% 5.1% 4.5% 4.5% 4.3% 
> $ 100 mn 
to <= $ 500 
mn  
4.5% 4.5% 4.6% 4.7% 4.9% 5.2% 5.1% 4.9% 4.6% 4.5% 
> $ 50 mn 
to <= $ 100 
mn  
4.7% 4.8% 4.7% 4.7% 4.9% 5.2% 5.3% 5.3% 5.1% 5.0% 
> $ 25 mn 
to <= 50 mn  4.6% 4.8% 4.8% 4.7% 4.8% 5.0% 4.9% 4.9% 4.7% 4.6% 
<= $ 25 mn  4.8% 4.6% 4.6% 4.8% 4.6% 4.8% 4.7% 4.9% 4.6% 4.5% 
           
Public  4.6% 4.5% 4.5% 4.6% 4.5% 4.9% 4.9% 4.8% 4.6% 4.5% 
Independent  4.6% 4.7% 4.7% 4.8% 5.1% 5.2% 5.1% 4.9% 4.7% 4.6% 
           
Full sample  4.6% 4.6% 4.7% 4.7% 4.9% 5.1% 5.0% 4.9% 4.6% 4.5% 
Table 2: Average annual calculated spending rates, 1999-200825  
 
The overall sample from the NACUBO survey in 2008 states an average spending rate of 
4.6%. As one can see in the last table the spending rates are very stable and so the university 
can plan in advance how much money will be available from the endowment fund.  
                                                 
24 cp. NACUBO commonfund endowment study follow-up survey (2008), page 4  
25 cp. NACUBO endowment study, average annual calculated spending rates 2008-1999 (2008), page 1  
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2.4. Differences between university endowment funds and traditional funds  
When comparing university endowments to other (also institutional) investors, there arise 
some interesting points. Universities live theoretically forever and so they have an infinite 
investment horizon.26 Furthermore it can be said that universities rely more on the tactical 
and also strategic asset allocation than the managers of traditional funds do. Especially the 
large universities have a higher exposure to alternative assets than the average traditional 
fund, which can also be explained by higher knowledge of the portfolio managers at the 
university funds. At the universities the portfolio managers have access to the latest portfolio 
optimization theories and very important in this context is the knowledge how to apply these 
theories.27 The next difference between a traditional fund and a university endowment fund 
are the tax relieves they enjoy28 and the fewer regulatory constraints on their investments29.  
 
Particularly the large endowment funds, like Yale and Harvard, have a volume of their funds 
where others can only dream of having that. The university endowment funds achieve 
considerable returns at a much lower risk level than the typical 50% equity and 50% bond 
portfolio.30 Another point is that when having such a huge volume of the fund, one can cope 
easier with losses on investments, the universities have a clear defined spending policy and it 
is legally forbidden for them to spend more than their return on investments.31  
 
                                                 
26 cp. e.g. Dimmock (2007), page 2 or Brown, Garlappi, Tiu (2008), page 2  
27 cp. Brown, Garlappi, Tiu (2008), page 2  
28 cp. Dimmock (2007), page 2  
29 cp. Brown, Garlappi, Tiu (2008), page 2  
30 cp. Frontier Capital Management (2007), page 1 et seqq.  
31 cp. Dimmock (2007), page 2  
15 
2.5. Differences among US endowment funds  
 
2.5.1. Hard facts  
An interesting fact about the schools included in the NACUBO survey is that schools 
included in the survey tend to be more likely private, larger and selective than the common 
average school. Lerner, Schoar and Wang examined in their study, that only 45% of the 
private schools of the College Board sample are covered in their endowment data (which 
they got from NACUBO), and only 18% of the public schools are comprised. Summarising, 
NACUBO covers much more small private schools, than small public schools.32 The results 
of Lerner, Schoar and Wang are combined in the following table "Differences between the 
average endowment and the Ivy League33".  
The table comprises data for all schools and three sub-samples: the Ivy League, private 
(besides the Ivy League) and public schools. The asset allocation is calculated in percentage 
of the endowment's total market value. "Median growth" shows the median for each sub-
sample for the mean annual growth (from 1993 to 2005), for the available data. Lerner, 
Schoar and Wang adjusted the dollar values to 2005 values and the returns were deflated 
using the Consumer Price Index. Endowment return is the return for the stated fiscal year. 34 
 
 
                                                 
32 cp. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008), page 4  
33 Members of the Ivy League are: Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard, Penn, Princeton and Yale  
Ivy League is an old nickname for the above mentioned schools, which formed an athletic association in 1954 
34 cp. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008), page 22  
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Descriptive statistics:  
 1993 2005 Median 
Growth 
 Median # schools Median # schools  
All 
Endowment size ($ mil)  60 533 72 726 7.4%  
% endowment return  13.2%  486 9.0% 707 N/A 
% alternative allocation  4.8%  50 7.6%  712 23.8%  
% equity allocation  60.1%  58 59.6%  719 -1.4%  
% fixed income allocation  31.5%  52 20.4%  719 -3.1%  
Spending rate  5.0%  350 4.9%  681 0.3%  
Total students  2,271 875 2,283 879 0.6%  
SAT math 75th percentile  590 555 620 563 0.4%  
Tuition ($) 11,556 643 16,490 879 2.7% 
      
Ivy League  
Endowment size ($ mil)  2,040  8 4,780 8 8.6% 
% alternative allocation  17.6% 5 37.1%  6 23.0%  
% equity allocation  52.9% 5 38.1% 6 -2.3%  
% fixed income allocation  27.8% 5 13.0% 6 -1.4%  
Spending rate  4.6%  7 4.6% 6 0.6%  
Total students  5,600 8 5,510 8 0.3%  
SAT math 75th percentile  735 8 760 7 0.4%  
Tuition ($)  24,023 6 29,995 8 1.8%  
      
Public  
Endowment size ($ mil)  50 129 66 187 10.6%  
% alternative allocation  2.9%  10 5.2% 185 22.0%  
% equity allocation  61.4%  12 60.5%  187 -1.2%  
% fixed income allocation  33.6%  11 22.1%  187 -1.2%  
Spending rate  5.0%  79 4.4%  174 -0.2%  
Total students  9,800 272 9,280 272 0.4%  
SAT math 75th percentile  580 119 610 136 10.6%  
Tuition ($)  2,343 208 3,591 272 3.8%  
      
Private  
Endowment size ($ mil)  60 353 72 471 6.3%  
% alternative allocation  5.3%  32 9.0%  461 26.0%  
% equity allocation 59.8%  38 59.5%  466 -1.6%  
% fixed income allocation  31.7%  34 19.5%  466 -2.3%  
Spending rate  5.0%  231 5.0%  447 0.5%  
Total students  1,590 595 1,740 595 0.8%  
SAT math 75th percentile  590 428 620 420 6.3%  
Tuition ($)  14,331 429 19,600 595 2.5%  
 
Table 3: Differences between the average endowment and the Ivy League35 
 
 
                                                 
35 cp. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008), page 22, NACUBO and the College Board  
17 
As one can see in the last table, only about 31% (in 2005) of the schools covered are public 
schools, showing a lower median endowment size, a lower median exposure to alternative 
assets, but a higher median exposure to equity and fixed income than the average endowment 
fund. Furthermore public schools have lower spending rates, a lower tuition and a lower 
SAT36 math 75th percentile.  
However, the median of total students over all endowments lies at 2,283, public schools have 
9,280 and the Ivy League has on average 5,510 students per university (in 2005). Great 
differences can also be seen in the section of the endowment size, the median in 2005 for all 
universities was at $ 72 million, public schools had $ 66 million, private schools had $ 72 
million and the Ivy League had $ 4,780 million. Another interesting point is the exposure to 
alternative assets (like hedge funds, commodities or private equity), where the Ivy League 
shows an above-average exposure: the median for all endowment funds lies at 9.0%, public 
schools have 5.2%, private schools 9.0% and the Ivy League has an exposure to alternative 
assets of 37.1%. Due to the lower asset allocation to alternative assets, the other universities 
have higher exposures to equities and fixed income, whereas the Ivy League has much lower 
exposures to these asset classes.  
Reasons for the differences in the asset allocation might be that smaller universities do not 
have enough financial resources to hire managers with such a specific and considerable 
knowledge in alternative assets and furthermore one also have to keep the minimum 
investment requirements in mind. Another point is that it seems likely that for larger funds it 
is easier to manage the illiquid private equities and in addition they have enough capital to 
research on those investments.37 
 
Differences can be detected as well in the growth rate of the endowment fund value, where 
public schools show a larger growth rate of 10.6% than the other universities involved 
(median 7.4%). This can be avowed by a more important role of donations and other 
government transactions in the public university sector.38 
Summarising, roughly speaking one cannot compare the Ivy League in any sector with the 
average US university, whereas the differences between public and private schools are 
neglectable. 
 
                                                 
36 Scholastic Assessment Test: a test in three major areas, critical reading, mathematics and writing, which is 
necessary for many university applications in the United States  
http://www.collegeboard.com/about/news_info/sat/factsheet.html  
37 cp. Brown, Garlappi and Tiu (2008), page 11  
38 cp. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008), page 5 
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2.5.2. Investment returns  
There exist also large changes in the endowment fund values of the large universities over 
time, which go along with the "rich getting richer" phenomena. The explanation therefore 
includes three major categories: higher investment returns, higher donations and lower 
spending-rates. In the survey of Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008) the differences concerning 
spending-rates are only minor. So the higher endowment fund value is achieved by higher 
investment returns and a higher amount of donations, where unfortunately no detailed data is 
available.39 
In the below figure one can see the excess returns (computed with the S&P 500 Index) 
separated by school types.  
 
 
 Figure 4: Excess returns in 2005 separated by school type40 
 
It is obviously that the Ivy League always outperformed drastically the other universities, 
especially in 2000 where the outperformance lies at 14%. Also private universities (again 
excluding the Ivy League) are located at the above average. Concerning the persistence the 
data shows that schools with higher SAT and larger endowments performed similarly 
between 1992 and 2005. The statistical analysis of Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008) has 
shown a correlation coefficient of 0.4 between the endowment performance and endowment 
size and/or SAT score. Both variables are positively and independently correlated with the 
endowment fund performance.  
                                                 
39 cp. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008), page 6  
40 Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008), page 24  
   The figure includes only schools with data available for minimum 10 years.  
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2.5.3. Endowment managers  
 
2.5.3.1. Importance of endowment managers41  
The overall endowment size plays also a decisive role concerning the economies of scale. 
The smaller the endowments are, the larger is the probability that the endowment is managed 
by an internal general university financial officer. Larger universities have the possibility of 
hiring external and internal managers with more extensive skills. According to the NACUBO 
Endowment Survey 87% of the assets in university endowment funds are managed by 
external managers and 74.6% hire outside consultants.42 
Another point worth mentioning is that the top universities have the ability of finding the 
best new members of staff in their alumni network. The skill of the manager plays a central 
role in the endowment fund's investment success. Among others, Brown et. al. (2008) argue 
that managers of large endowment funds have higher skills compared to the smaller funds. 
 
2.5.3.2. Compensation of internal endowment managers43  
The compensation of internal endowment managers is a difficult and controversial topic at 
some universities, e.g. two bond traders of the Harvard endowment group, Maurice Samuels 
and David Mittelman, earned each about $ 34 million in the year 2003. But after different 
outcries their compensation has been reduced to $ 25 million in the following year, which 
lead again to debates.  
These salaries are very high compared to other university staff, but if one compares the 
compensation to what the managers would earn in other private organization or hedge funds, 
the university wages lie far below these figures. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008) examined 
investment officers' compensation by GuideStar, which said that the investment officers are 
"one of the five highest-paid employees, between 1997 and 2004". Besides, they examined a 
sample of 206 employees, where it says that the compensation levels are relatively modest 
by the private financial sector standards. The mean compensation for a reported endowment 
officer per year was at $ 1.9 million. In addition one can keep track on increasing salaries 
with increasing endowment fund sizes and excess returns, as well as high SAT scores, which 
are consistently correlated with the overall endowment fund performance. 
                                                 
41 cp. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008)  
42 cp. Dimmock (2009), page 7 (based on the NACUBO Endowment Survey 2003)  
43 cp. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008) and Seward (2005)  
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Lerner, Schoar and Wang compared yearly compensation data of top quarter schools with 
bottom quarter schools, measured by the excess return above the S&P 500 Index, where top 
quarter managers earned $ 4.2 million compared to $ 1.7 million for the bottom quarter 
managers. When comparing the data by endowment size, top quarter managers earn $ 5.3 
million compared to the bottom quarter managers with $ 100,000. Schools and universities 
being part of the top quarter by SAT scores, pay their manager on average $ 6.1 million, 
compared to the compensation of bottom quarter managers with $ 130,000.  
 
 
 Figure 5: Mangement compensation44  
 
The question that appears now is "are top endowments more successful, because they 
compensate their managers higher, or is the higher compensation just reflecting their 
success"? The correlation in this case seems only weak and there is just qualitative evidence. 
Also schools with incentive-based compensation, e.g. Harvard Management Company45 or 
Stanford 46, were affected by large-scale betrayals by their investment staff.  
 
 
                                                 
44 cp, Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008), page 14  
45 cp. Seward (2005)  
46 cp. Grant and Buckman (2006)  
21 
However, not only in the investment sector incentive-based compensation is tended to be 
more and more debated, this is a general problem of remuneration of higher level 
employees.47 The universities react with non-pecuniary benefits, like being a member of a 
successful academic community. 
 
Endowment managers and the investment committee fall important decisions as the asset 
allocation, which will be dealt on in the next chapter.  
 
                                                 
47 cp. Mayer, Pfeiffer and Reichel (2005)  
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3. Alternative asset allocation – the key to success?  
 
3.1. The successful asset allocation of endowment funds48  
For a portfolio the asset allocation is an important decision and whether it is the most 
important decision or not, will be dealt later on. Concerning asset allocation we can see 
considerable differences among the different endowment funds. Much of the performance is 
achieved through the decision about asset classes, which have different return and risk 
characteristics. Especially Yale and Harvard have the part of a role model, because they are 
the largest and most successful endowment funds. They are the leaders in investing into 
diversified multi-asset-classes over the last two decades, whereas the crucial point for their 
consistently achieved high double-digit annual returns is among others their considerable 
exposure to alternative asset classes. 
The basic principle for multi-asset-classes-investing is based on the Modern Portfolio Theory 
by Harry Markowitz, where he explained how one can improve risk adjusted returns, by 
diversifying the portfolio across assets with varied correlations. 
 
As one can see in the following table "10 year annualised returns by endowment fund size to 
June 2006" the endowments with assets greater than $ 10 bn achieved annual returns of 
14.8%. Very interesting is the aspect that the fraction of traditional assets in the portfolio lies 
by only 47.5% whereas the average endowment fund has invested 81.2% in traditional 
assets.  
 
 
US 
Equity/Bond 
Portfolio 
UK 
Equity/Bond 
Portfolio 
Average 
endowment 
funds 
Endowment 
funds with 
assets  
> $ 1 bn 
Endowment 
funds with 
assets  
> $ 10 bn 
10 year 
annualized 
return 
7.5% 7.4% 8.8% 11.4% 14.8% 
Traditional 
Assets % 
of Total 
Portfolio 
100% 100% 81.2% 59.6% 47.5% 
 
Table 4: 10 year annualised returns by endowment fund size as of June 200649 
 
                                                 
48 cp. Frontier Capital Management (2007)  
49 cp. Frontier Capital Management (2007), page 2  
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The large US endowment funds have compared to the others very innovative portfolios with 
exposures to multiple asset classes, providing additional diversification benefits, like many 
years ago also promoted by Harry Markowitz. In the following figures one can see the 
differences between an average US endowment fund asset allocation and the asset allocation 
of funds with assets greater than $ 10 bn.  
 
    
 Figure 6: AA of Average US endowment funds50 Figure 7: AA of US endowment funds with assets  
  greater than $ 10 bn51 
 
As one can see in the above figures, large US endowment funds have a much larger exposure 
to real estate, commodities, hedge funds and private equity, whereas having a smaller 
exposure to listed equity, fixed income and cash than the average US endowment fund.  
 
Yale and Harvard are the two largest endowment funds in the US and not also concerning 
the size they are the trend-setter, but also their asset allocation is different to the other 
endowment funds.  
There has always been a considerable time-lag between the investment of super endowments 
in an asset class and the investment of the average endowment fund. As an example examine 
the investment in venture capital: Members of the Ivy League started to invest into venture 
capital in the early 1970s, whereas corporation pension funds followed mainly in the 80s and 
in the 90s the public pension funds did so. Nowadays one can see that the time-lags have 
declined.52  
 
                                                 
50 cp. Frontier Capital Management (2007), page 2 and Nacubo (2006)  
51 cp. Frontier Capital Management (2007), page 2 and various annual reports  
52 cp. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008), page 18  
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As one can see in the following figure the asset allocation of the "super endowments", Yale 
and Harvard, deviates from those of endowment funds with assets greater than $ 10 bn. Yale 
and Harvard have a slightly larger exposure to alternative asset classes than the other 
endowment funds have and they take out a loan in cash. However, both invest the majority 
of the alternative exposure into hedge funds.53 
 
Figure 8: Super Endowment's Asset Allocation 54 
 
In the next figure one can see the asset allocation from the super endowment funds from 
1999 to 2006. For sure, also the super endowments make adjustments from time to time to 
their asset allocation, but overall they stick to their principle asset allocation. 
 
Figure 9: Super endowment asset allocation over time55 
 
Summarising, the super endowments feature far less correlation to the equity market than 
their smaller peers do and they have a far larger exposure to volatile, smaller stocks.56 
 
                                                 
53 cp. Frontier Capital Management (2007), page 3  
54 cp. Frontier Capital Management (2007), page 3 and annual reports (Yale and Harvard)  
55 Frontier Capital Management (2007), page 4 and various annual reports  
56 cp. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008), page 16  
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3.2. Benefiting from the super endowment's asset allocation57  
The Frontier Capital Management tried to reconstruct the super endowment's asset allocation 
with benchmarking to the asset allocation. An important point is, that most individuals do 
not have the ability to actively invest like the super endowments, especially in asset classes 
like private equity. However, one can also see significant results with an index-tracking 
portfolio following the multi-asset investing approach from the super endowment funds. The 
index-tracking portfolio of Frontier Capital Management used the annual asset allocation of 
the super endowment funds, which were applied to the returns on eight certain global asset 
class indices. 
The benchmark indices used by the Frontier Capital Management are:  
(All indices are currency hedge into USD and total return) 
• Global equities: MSCI World Equities  
• Global bonds: JPMorgan GBI; Citigroup US Corporate Bonds  
• Emerging equities: MSCI Emerging Market Equities  
• Emerging bonds: JP Morgan Emerging Market Bonds  
• Real estate: Dow Jones Wilshire Global Real Estate Securities Index  
• Commodities: Dow Jones AIG Commodity Index  
• Hedge funds: HFR fund of funds  
• Managed futures: CISDM Composite  
 
As private equity is not suitable for an index-tracking portfolio it was excluded, as well as 
cash for a better comparison to traditional equity-bond-portfolios. As it was difficult for 
FCM to get data concerning super endowment funds before January 1999, portfolio returns 
were estimated since this date. In the following figure 6 one can see the adjusted asset 
allocation with the corresponding benchmark.  
 
                                                 
57 cp. Frontier Capital Management (2007)  
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Figure 10: Adjusted super endowment's asset allocation58  Figure 11: Index tracking portfolio vs. classical59 
 
The index-tracking portfolio achieved for the tested period (December 1998 till December 
2006) an annualized return of 10.3% whereas the traditional US equity-bond-portfolio 
achieved only 4.4% and the UK equity-bond-portfolio reached 4.1% (hedged into USD). The 
estimated index-tracking portfolio outperformed not only the US and UK equity-bond-
portfolio, but also many managed macro funds, like UK IMA Balanced Managed or UK 
IMA Cautious Managed over the last one and three years.  
 
 
Annualised 
1 year 
return 
Annualised 
3 year 
return 
Annualised 3 
year standard 
deviation 
3 year return 
/ 
3 year 
standard 
deviation 
IMA Cautious Managed 3.5% 9.2% 8.3% 1.1 
IMA Balanced Managed 3.6% 12.7% 8.3% 1.5 
Super Endowment 
Index Portfolio 10.4% 14.7% 6.9% 2.1 
 
 Table 5: Index-tracking portfolio (hedged into GBP) vs. UK managed funds60 
 
One of the main advantages of the endowment funds is that they provide higher returns at 
much lower volatility, as one can see in table 4. The super endowment funds achieve also 
compared to other institutional investors much higher investment returns.61 By the way, the 
super endowments can influence the funds they invest in, as the investment of an elite 
university can initiate a rush of capital to the invested fund.62 
 
                                                 
58 cp. Frontier Capital Management (2007), page 5 and annual reports  
59 Frontier Capital Management (2007), page 5 and annual reports and Bloomberg  
60 cp. Frontier Capital Management (2007), page 5 and Morningstar  
61 cp. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008), page 1  
62 cp. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008), page 18  
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Summarising, the US endowment funds have due to their multi-asset approach a progress 
asset allocation with exposures to alternative asset classes. Especially Yale and Harvard 
achieved over the last years constantly double-digit returns at lower volatility compared to 
other (institutional) investors. The Frontier Capital Management argues that one can achieve 
similar returns with an index-tracking portfolio, however for individual investors it is more 
difficult because of investing constraints. Though, other studies which will be dealt later on 
will show that asset allocation per se is not sufficient for an overall endowment success. 
When someone tries to mimic a super endowment's asset allocation by an index-tracking 
portfolio, one have to take it with a pinch of salt.  
 
3.3. There is more behind it than a successful asset allocation  
It is true, that the asset allocation of the super endowments is very successful and innovative, 
but there is more to it than the asset allocation. For investing that profitable, a high security 
selection ability is necessary. There are some institutional investors around the globe who 
tried to imitate the super endowment's asset allocation, e.g. Kuwait Investment Fund imitated 
Yale's asset allocation, when changing their investment strategy.63  
 
In the following table "return decomposition" one can see what a difference the security 
selection makes, i.e. the difference between the benchmark return and the endowment fund 
investment return. The Ivy League shows the highest overall return with a mean of 14.9% 
and also the highest excess return over the benchmark with a mean of 5.09% from 1994 till 
2005.  
 
 
 
                                                 
63 cp. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008), page 10 and Sender (2007)  
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 Table 6: Return decomposition64 
                                                 
64 cp. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008), page 27 and NACUBO 
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Data explanation:65  
The benchmark returns for the table "return decomposition" were computed on the following 
basis (annual yields): 
• Equities: S&P 500 Index  
• Fixed income: Lehman US Aggregate bond index  
• Real estate: Case-Shiller index  
• Cash: three-month treasury rate  
• Private equities and venture capital: investments reported in the VentureXpert 
database  
• Hedge funds: returns reported in the Hennessee Hedge Fund Index  
 
The sample contains only schools, which reported at least 10 years of their total return data. 
The subgroups are defined as the following: 
• Ivy League: Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard, Penn, Princeton and 
Yale  
• Private: all private schools and universities, except members of the Ivy League  
• Large endowments: all schools and universities in the top quartile of endowment size 
concerning the data of 1992, except members of the Ivy League  
• High SAT: all schools and universities in the top quartile of SAT scores concerning 
the data of 1992, except members of the Ivy League  
 
Return indicates the value-weighted average endowment return and the benchmark returns 
are calculated with the asset allocation of each group of endowments (with the five asset 
classes fixed income, equities, real estate, alternatives and others). 
 
As one can see in the prior table "return decomposition", between 2000 and 2005 all 
subgroups outperformend their benchmarks. The reason therefore is the good security 
selection ability of the endowment fund managers. Having a look at the table, shows that 
from 1994 to 1999 outperforming was not that easy for the managers, this might be 
explained by the growing security selection ability of the managers and also the changing 
asset allocation.  
The outperformance is especially visible in the alternative asset class, where the super 
                                                 
65 cp. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008)  
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endowments have been definitely the precursors. They tended to invest earlier into 
alternative assets and they achieved much higher returns within this asset class, than the 
other schools and universities. The key factors for their success are likely to be timing, 
experience and access to information and products. In some cases it is even more difficult for 
the small educational institutions to invest because of minimum investments and also for 
over the counter products it is not that easy for them.  
 
Summarising one can say, that the super endowments achieve considerable returns over time 
and whether the asset allocation is the clue or not will be dealt on in the next step.  
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4. Performance analysis66  
 
Brown, Garlappi and Tiu (2008) made a performance analysis, based on the decomposition 
of the returns to the following active and passive components:  
• Passive: The long-term strategic asset allocation decision.  
• Active: The short-term tactical asset allocation decision, i.e. market timing.  
• Active: The potentially short-term security selection decision.  
Similar methodologies have also been applied by Wermers (2000) and Daniel, Grinblatt, 
Titman and Wermers (1997) for mutual funds. For a classical attribution analysis see also 
Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2009).  
 
For analyzing the separate components of the return, the first step is to determine the overall 
endowment return:  
 
 
 
 
 
This formula implies that the portfolio weights will be adjusted only one time per period and 
this will be stated at the end of the period for the next period; furthermore ri,j,t is the buy-and-
hold-return. In the NACUBO surveys one can only see the realized return on the fund, but 
not the return on the separate asset class. 
 
4.1. Data explanation 
The study is based on data from the NACUBO surveys from 1984 till 2005, including 
universities in the US, Canada and Puerto Rico with complete information (i.e. asset 
allocation, return and overall fund size).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 cp. Brown, Garlappi and Tiu (2008)  
Ri,t  realized return on the fund i  
t  period  
wi.j,t  actual portfolio weight of the 
fund i in asset class j at the 
end of period t  
ri,j,t  period-t return on asset 
class j 
N set of investable asset 
classes  
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 Table 7: Overview NACUBO data from 1984 till 200567  
                                                 
67 cp. Brown, Garlappi and Tiu (2008), page 38  
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As one can see in the last table, the AuM (assets under management) rose by nearly ten times 
from $ 25.39 bn up to $ 249.30 bn. Whereas in the AuMs one can see a clear positive trend, 
the returns show high fluctuations.  
 
4.2. The strategic asset allocation  
The strategic asset allocation decision is a passive decision, which is typically taken by the 
management board of the endowment. 
Brown, Garlappi and Tiu (2008) ranked the funds to the return by the stated asset allocation 
decision and the total return of the portfolio. For a coherence of return and asset allocation 
the correlation needs to be close to one, though they computed a correlation of 0.05, which 
predicts an independence of the two variables. 
The second test consists of the performance of a hypothetical portfolio, which tries to mimic 
the portfolio by investing like the stated asset allocation into representative indices. The 
conclusion says that this indices portfolio lies only at the bottom 40% of the comparison 
group, which means that asset allocation is not the most important component of the return.  
 
Principally one can test the success of the asset allocation by investing into the benchmarks 
for each asset class, this means that there is no security selection ability and no market 
timing necessary. The return therefore can be computed as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The security selection return can be computed very easily, because therefore one only needs 
the asset allocation and the benchmark indices for the separate asset class. As both 
information is available in the stated annual reports of the colleges, one can compute the 
benchmark return for the funds. However, keep in mind that the information is usually not 
available in advance and so one will only have lagged portfolio weights. By applying only 
one weight of the asset class for the prior period one also neglects possible weight 
adjustments during the period. The information about benchmarks is summarised in the 
RBi,t  benchmark return for fund i  
t  period  
wBi.j,t-1 asset allocation policy weight 
in asset class j at the end of 
period t-1  
rBj,t  buy-and-hold-return on the 
benchmark index in period t 
for asset class j  
N set of investable asset 
classes  
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following two tables, "Benchmark definitions and calculations" and "Benchmark 
correlations". The table reports summary statistics for the asset class representative indices, 
SR (Sharpe Ratio) and alpha's and their t-statistics were computed.  
 
Summary statistics:  
 
 
Asset Class Benchmark index Mean Std Median SR Alpha t-stat 
1. US Equity Russell 3000 9.93 13.37 11.39 0.43 -2.11 -3.25 
2. Non US 
Equity 
MSCI World 
(Excl. US)  4.46 13.31 5.82 0.02 1.02 0.22 
3. US Fixed 
Income  
Lehman Bond 
Aggregate  8.04 4.41 8.64 0.88 0.54 0.52 
4. 
Non US 
Fixed 
Income  
Salomon 
Brothers Non 
US Bond Index  
7.89  9.08 7.60 0.41 4.99 1.02 
5. Public Real 
Estate NAREIT 13.27 12.79 9.06 0.71 -1.77 -0.34 
6. Private Real 
Estate NCREIF 7.81 6.55 8.07 0.56 4.59 1.07 
7. Hedge Funds  HFRI-all fund 
Composite  14.31 7.61 13.09 1.34 7.13 2.01 
8. Venture Capital  
Cambridge 
Associate VC 
Index  
26.59 56.20 17.42 0.40 26.07 1.47 
9. Private Equity 
Cambridge 
Associate PE 
Index  
14.76 13.74 15.38 0.77 5.87 1.27 
10. Natural 
Resources  
AMEX Oil 
(before 1992), 
GCSI (after 
1992)  
7.02 16.87 1.33 0.17 6.07 0.59 
11. Other 
Investments - - - - - - - 
12. Cash 30-day US T-
bill 4.14 1.92 4.73 0.00 0.00 - 
 
Table 8: Benchmark definitions and calculations68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 cp. Brown, Garlappi and Tiu (2008), page 41  
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 Asset Class 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. US Equity 1.00            
2. Non US 
Equity 0.60 1.00 
          
3. US Fixed 
Income  -0.03 -0.57 1.00 
         
4. 
Non US 
Fixed 
Income  
-0.10 -0.11 0.26 1.00         
5. Public Real 
Estate -0.02 0.20 0.08 -0.17 1.00 
       
6. Private Real 
Estate 0.20 0.17 
-
0.31 -0.57 0.02 1.00 
      
7. Hedge 
Funds  0.55 0.56 
-
0.05 0.07 0.03 -0.46 1.00 
     
8. Venture 
Capital  0.37 0.45 
-
0.31 -0.20 -0.30 0.21 0.53 1.00 
    
9. Private 
Equity 0.79 0.80 
-
0.32 -0.22 0.14 0.36 0.56 0.56 1.00 
   
10. Natural 
Resources  0.79 0.47 
-
0.42 -0.09 -0.12 0.28 0.18 0.49 0.28 1.00 
  
11. Other 
Investments - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
12. Cash 0.27 -0.21 0.32 -0.35 -0.40 -0.04 0.23 0.21 0.01 -0.09 - 1.00 
 
Table 9: Benchmark correlations69 
 
4.3. The tactical asset allocation, i.e. market timing  
The tactical asset allocation, i.e. market timing, deals with the returns from adjusting the 
asset allocation when varying expected returns occur. In other papers this component is also 
called "characteristic timing".70 
The marketing timing return can be computed as follows: 
  
 
In order to increase or decrease the returns and/or  
risk, one have to change the weights to the  
benchmark assets. Here occurs the problem with  
the lag in portfolio weights as well, i.e. that one  
only knows the real portfolio weights ex post.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 cp. Brown, Garlappi and Tiu (2008), page 41 
70 cp. Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) and Wermers (2000)  
RTi  market timing return  
t  period  
wi.j,t-1 actual asset allocation policy 
weight in asset class j at the 
end of period t-1  
wBi.j,t-1 corresponding policy weight 
for the same investment 
horizon, decided one period 
in advance  
rBj,t  buy-and-hold-return on the 
benchmark index in period t 
for asset class j  
N set of investable asset 
classes  
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4.4. The security selection  
As also mentioned before, the super endowments enjoy a strong ability in choosing the right 
securities, which can be lead back to a good investment committee and employees. Brown et 
al. (2008) show the empirical evidence that security selection is the key determinant of the 
successful performances.  
The security selection ability can be shown by computing the excess return from the asset 
class over the benchmark of the asset class. This can be expressed as follows:  
 
  
 
In the database from Brown et. al. (2008) they  
did not compute the returns for all single asset  
classes. Though one can compute the security  
selection return by rearranging the other  
formulas stated before:  
 
 
The security selection return is the whole portfolio fund return minus the benchmark return 
minus the market timing return.  
 
4.5. Results  
 
4.5.1. Results for all funds  
The results of the tests (by applying the formulas from the recent chapters) by Brown et. al. 
(2008) are summarised in the following table 8 "test results". As one can see, the largest part 
of the portfolio return is the benchmark return. The grand mean over all years from the 
excess return over the benchmark lies at 1.65%.  
 
 
 
 
 
RSi,t security selection return  
t  period  
wi,j,t-1 actual asset allocation policy 
weight in asset class j at the 
end of period t-1  
rj,j,t  return generated by a 
portfolio of securities for 
asset class j 
rBj,t  buy-and-hold-return on the 
benchmark index in period t 
for asset class j 
N set of investable asset 
classes  
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Year  R RB RT RS R-RB 
2005 Mean 9.67 8.70 -0.58 1.55 0.97 
 Std 3.19 2.14 1.40 2.52 2.68 
2004 Mean 15.63 14.21 -0.43 1.86 1.43 
 Std 4.07 2.21 1.49 3.08 3.28 
2003 Mean 2.37 1.48 0.41 0.48 0.89 
 Std 3.46 1.41 1.11 3.18 3.37 
2002 Mean -6.13 -9.19 0.72 2.33 3.05 
 Std 4.15 3.11 2.16 4.05 4.41 
2001 Mean -3.42 -8.19 -0.40 5.18 4.77 
 Std 6.23 3.00 2.19 6.05 6.15 
2000 Mean 13.02 10.47 0.88 1.67 2.56 
 Std 10.60 5.28 3.62 7.29 8.24 
1999 Mean 10.85 12.11 0.28 -1.55 -1.27 
 Std 4.83 2.04 1.72 4.63 4.91 
1998 Mean 18.09 18.01 0.12 -0.04 0.08 
 Std 3.82 2.56 2.11 3.76 3.63 
1997 Mean 20.14 17.92 1.14 1.08 2.22 
 Std 4.42 3.68 3.52 4.21 5.09 
1996 Mean 17.35 14.58 0.27 2.50 2.77 
 Std 4.13 2.91 3.03 4.23 3.68 
1995 Mean 15.26 15.76 -0.65 0.14 -0.51 
 Std 4.09 2.06 2.07 3.95 3.82 
1994 Mean 3.39 -0.07 0.16 3.30 3.46 
 Std 4.54 1.27 0.90 4.26 4.37 
1993 Mean 13.46 11.82 0.23 1.41 1.64 
 Std 4.01 1.52 1.27 4.05 4.23 
1992 Mean 13.00 11.24 0.12 1.64 1.76 
 Std 4.08 1.18 1.56 4.07 4.33 
1991 Mean 6.77 5.83 0.29 0.65 0.94 
 Std 4.31 1.36 2.04 4.41 4.10 
Grand Mean   9.96 8.31 0.17 1.48 1.65 
 Table 10: Test results71 
 
                                                 
71 cp. Brown, Garlappi and Tiu (2008), page 42  
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4.5.2. Subdivided results  
As argued before, especially the super endowments are different to the average endowment 
fund. Therefore Brown et. al. made the same analysis as before for sub samples, namely for 
large vs. small funds and for private vs. public funds. Especially at the large vs. small funds 
one can see clearly the difference in the excess return over the benchmark, whereas the large 
funds have an excess return of 2.51% (grand mean), the small funds have 0.88%. This 
clearly points out that larger funds have a better security selection ability. For private vs. 
public funds the difference is not clear, private funds show an excess return of 1.68% and 
public funds 1.53%. 
39 
 
  AUM q4 – AUM q1 Private – Public 
  R R – RB R R – RB 
Year  q4 q1 Dif q4 q1 Dif Priv. Pub. Dif Priv. Pub. Dif 
2005 Mean 11.06 7.84 3.22 1.20 0.49 0.72 9.77 9.33 0.44 1.10 0.55 0.55 
 t-stat 35.73 21.42 6.23 5.28 1.56 1.81 61.80 28.24 1.30 8.04 2.19 1.94 
2004 Mean 16.85 13.60 3.25 1.99 0.92 1.07 15.65 15.56 0.09 1.48 1.25 0.22 
 t-stat 68.03 22.89 5.92 8.96 1.97 2.34 76.11 39.61 0.22 9.00 3.83 0.64 
2003 Mean 2.84 1.48 1.36 1.91 -0.54 2.45 2.51 1.89 0.62 1.04 0.38 0.66 
 t-stat 9.06 3.48 2.54 6.22 -1.32 4.72 13.86 5.28 1.60 6.01 1.03 1.75 
2002 Mean -5.44 -6.63 1.19 4.45 1.34 3.11 -6.19 -5.95 -0.25 2.97 3.34 -0.37 
 t-stat -15.12 -13.00 1.93 12.41 2.78 5.15 -27.83 -12.97 -0.52 13.57 5.87 0.73 
2001 Mean -3.74 -3.45 -0.28 5.22 3.33 1.90 -3.41 -3.44 0.03 4.74 4.90 -0.16 
 t-stat -6.80 -5.05 -0.32 9.95 4.76 2.16 -10.73 -4.69 0.04 15.26 6.56 -0.22 
2000 Mean 20.38 8.59 11.79 6.24 0.40 5.84 13.07 12.83 0.25 2.52 2.70 -0.18 
 t-stat 16.16 12.75 7.04 7.06 0.60 4.73 22.00 12.43 0.19 5.46 3.33 -0.18 
1999 Mean 11.47 10.14 1.33 -0.92 -1.53 0.61 10.84 10.89 -0.05 -1.27 -1.26 -0.01 
 t-stat 18.75 23.66 1.68 -1.52 -3.38 0.77 39.94 22.44 -0.09 -4.63 -2.46 -0.02 
1998 Mean 18.24 17.55 0.70 0.71 -0.50 1.21 18.13 17.96 0.16 0.17 -0.28 0.45 
 t-stat 53.28 41.47 1.29 2.28 -1.22 2.39 81.86 44.54 0.34 0.83 -0.68 0.99 
1997 Mean 21.28 18.83 2.45 2.88 1.64 1.23 20.17 20.02 0.15 2.25 2.11 0.15 
 t-stat 46.63 46.31 3.90 5.75 3.30 1.73 81.26 44.58 0.29 8.08 3.74 0.25 
1996 Mean 18.85 15.79 3.06 3.37 2.84 0.53 17.37 17.28 0.09 2.68 3.11 -0.43 
 t-stat 43.44 34.81 4.85 8.37 6.56 0.89 71.64 35.56 0.16 12.97 6.30 -0.89 
1995 Mean 15.97 14.07 1.90 0.40 -1.79 2.19 15.36 14.89 0.47 -0.37 -1.02 0.65 
 t-stat 39.29 30.36 3.07 1.04 -4.29 3.86 62.53 33.11 0.90 -1.59 -2.43 1.33 
1994 Mean 4.15 2.72 1.43 3.73 3.08 0.65 3.50 2.98 0.53 3.55 3.12 0.43 
 t-stat 7.32 7.79 1.98 6.85 8.44 0.92 11.46 7.16 0.84 12.00 8.11 0.70 
1993 Mean 14.98 12.5 2.63 2.75 0.82 1.93 13.45 13.52 -0.07 1.57 1.90 -0.33 
 t-stat 46.22 22.59 4.41 7.76 1.41 3.00 50.96 32.73 -0.14 5.60 4.54 -0.58 
1992 Mean 14.21 12.03 2.18 2.99 0.98 2.01 12.92 13.30 -0.38 1.73 1.87 -0.14 
 t-stat 28.33 21.40 2.81 5.56 1.55 2.38 41.66 31.11 -0.58 5.28 4.00 -0.20 
1991 Mean 6.05 7.92 -1.87 0.69 1.72 -1.03 6.91 6.15 0.76 1.09 0.30 0.79 
 t-stat 14.00 9.73 -2.23 1.68 2.16 -1.27 19.26 11.74 0.97 3.17 0.61 1.06  
Grand Mean  11.14 8.86 2.29 2.51 0.88 1.63 10.00 9.81 0.19 1.68 1.53 0.15  
 
Table 11: Subdivided results72 
 
                                                 
72 cp. Brown, Garlappi and Tiu (2008), page 43  
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Whereas the stated test tells that the benchmark return has the largest fraction on the overall 
return, no matter whether having a look on all endowments or only the large endowments. 
Further statistical tests, like computing the Spearman correlation index, generating a 
mimicking portfolio based on benchmark indices (which has been tried in many studies) or 
regress the returns said that asset allocation per se is not enough for an overall endowment 
success.73 It is the active security selection that is much more important for high investment 
return achievements, whereas an overreliance on the passive asset allocation decision hinders 
the performance success.74 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 cp. Brown, Garlappi and Tiu (2008), page 16 et seqq.  
74 Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000) state a much higher importance for asset allocation, than Brown et. al. (2008)   
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5. Why are US endowment funds so successful?  
 
As also argued by David Swensen in his book "Pioneering Portfolio Management", hedging 
the background risk is one of the central intention of a university endowment.75 Dimmock 
(2009) made an analysis on the background risk and its implications on university 
endowment funds.76 Therefore the first step is to define the term background risk: At 
universities background risk is understood to be the volatility of non-financial income. In the 
paper77 the background risk is measured in two different ways: 
• The first one is the time-series deviation from the growth rate and  
• The second one is the permanent component of the growth rate of non-financial 
income.  
The results of the study, no matter whether non-financial income is defined as total non-
financial income or as income per full-time equivalent student, say that there is a significant 
negative correlation between the actual portfolio volatility and the background risk of the 
university endowment fund. In addition it says that universities with higher income volatility 
have portfolios with lower standard deviation.  
 
Besides tested was the impact of background risk on the asset allocation of the fund. There is 
strong evidence that universities with higher background risk allocate more of their portfolio 
to fixed income and less to riskier asset classes as alternative assets, which can be explained 
due to the higher volatility and the illiquidity of the alternative asset class (especially of 
private equity and venture capital). So one can see that background risk has definitely an 
impact on the portfolio choice of a university endowment fund.  
 
Overall, there exist a few assumptions why the large US endowment funds, which by the 
way are all members of the so-called Ivy League, always get richer and richer. The most 
important factors are the benefits from the economies of scale in investing, expertise and 
genuine skills.78 Endowments in the US performed between 1992 and 2005 with a median 
growth rate of 7.4% per year and had a median return of 6.9%, the sample contained 1,300 
US educational endowments. However, those figures are dominated by the super 
                                                 
75 cp. Swensen (2000), page 14  
76 The study is based on NACUBO and NCES data until the year 2003, which makes the data comparable to the 
other studies used in my paper.  
77 cp. Dimmock (2009)  
78 cp. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008), page 0  
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endowments, because as of 2007 Yale and Harvard have grown to $ 35 bn and $ 22 bn in 
size.79 These figures are largely driven by the investment returns, as they outperformed the 
S&P 500 Index in 2005 by 7.9%.  
 
Some reasons why they are so successful might be that they have access to the best portfolio 
managers and that they are very well resourced. The Frontier Capital Management says that 
it is possible for smaller investors to rebuild the portfolio by applying a similar asset 
allocation, as described in the chapter "benefiting from the super endowment's asset 
allocation".80 Though, Lerner, Schoar and Wang have a different opinion; they caution other 
institutional investors against simply copying the investment strategies of the super 
endowment funds. They point out that there is much more behind than a risky asset 
allocation, the super endowments have superior asset selection abilities beyond their 
endowment strategies. Furthermore they mention that the super endowments benefit from the 
superior investment committees, highly talented and skilled investment managers and a huge 
social network and knowledge base.81 By the way, the members of the active investment 
committee are mostly part of the university's alumni network, who worked together for many 
years. A further factor of success might be that the super endowments are always 
communicating with their peers and so they are kind of sharing their knowledge.82 
 
Due to the considerable size of the endowments, universities like Yale and Harvard can cope 
with losses, as other institutional investors could not, e.g. like the $ 350 mn investment loss 
Harvard had to realize in 2007 on Sowood Capital Management.83 Furthermore an important 
point is that the investment strategies of Yale and Harvard performed very well in history, 
does not mean that the future will show the same picture. As already stated before, also the 
university endowment funds are affected by the credit crunch. In the news especially the 
asset allocation and diversification of the super endowments, as Yale and Harvard, are 
debated. However, although the universities were hit by the credit crunch, they still show an 
above average performance compared to other (institutional) investors. Unfortunately now, 
during the financial turmoil, many important data is not yet available for a detailed analysis.  
                                                 
79 cp. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008), page 2  
80 cp. Frontier Capital Management, page 1  
81 cp. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008), page 2-3  
82 cp. Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008), page 15  
83 cp. Karmin and Zuckerman (2007)  
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6. The structure of Yale's endowment fund84  
 
The Yale endowment, which is managed by the Yale Investment Office and not by a 
separate or external company, achieved over the last years considerable (mostly double-
digit) investment returns. The chief investment officer is David Swensen, who started 
managing the Yale endowment in 1985 with a volume of $ 1,3 bn.85 Although the investment 
return in the last year lies only at 4.5%, from 2004 till 2008 they made an average annual 
return of 19.42%, they outperformed not only their benchmark, but also other institutional 
fund indices. According to the Yale endowment management, the substantial return is the 
consequence of a disciplined, diversified asset allocation policy and superior active portfolio 
management, with assistance of high capital market returns. However, also the Yale 
endowment feels the impact of the credit crunch, on December 16, President Levin said "Our 
best estimate of the Endowment's value today is $ 17 billion, a decline of 25 percent since 
June 30, 2008", which includes already considerable writedowns. As one can see in the 
following figure, the Yale Endowment fund is allocated to different sub-categories, as 
mostly donors want a specific purpose for their gifts. The three largest parts (with the size of 
about one fourth) are professorships, teaching and lectureships, miscellaneous specific 
purposes and unrestricted funds. On the other side one can see how the operating budget 
revenue is split-up, where the largest part with 37% comes from the endowment return 
(which is in numbers $ 850 million).  
        
 Figure 12: Yale Endowment Fund Allocation 200886 Figure 13: Yale Operating Budget Revenue 200887  
 
                                                 
84 cp. The Yale Endowment annual report 2008  
85 cp. Handelsblatt (March 2009)  
86 cp. The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 4  
87 cp. The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 4  
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 Fiscal year 
 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
Market value (in million $)  22,869.7 22,530.2 18,030.6 15,224.9 12,747.2 
Return 4.5%  28.0%  22.9%  22.3%  19.4%  
      
Spending (in million $)  849.9 684.0 616.0 567.0 502.0 
Operating Budget Revenues (in 
million $)  
2,280.2 2,075.0 1,932.0 1,768.0 1,630.8 
Endowment Percentage 37.3%  33.0%  31.9%  32.2%  30.8%  
      
Asset Allocation (as of June 30)       
Absolute Return  25.1%  23.3%  23.3%  25.7%  26.1%  
Domestic Equity  10.1%  11.0%  11.6%  14.1%  14.8%  
Fixed Income  4.0%  4.0%  3.8%  4.9%  7.4%  
Foreign Equity 15.2%  14.1%  14.6%  13.7%  14.8%  
Private Equity 20.2%  18.7%  16.4%  14.8%  14.5%  
Real Assets  29.3%  27.1%  27.8%  25.0%  18.8%  
Cash -3.9%  1.9%  2.5%  1.9%  3.5%  
Table 12: Yale endowment overview 2004-200888  
 
Figure 14: Yale endowment market value 1950-2008 (in billion $)89  
                                                 
88 cp. The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 0  
89 cp. The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 0 
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6.1. Endowment purpose90  
According to David Swensen, the chef investment officer of the Yale university endowment 
fund, who wrote by the way the book "Pioneering Portfolio Management – An 
Unconventional Approach to Institutional Investment", endowments have the following 
purposes:  
 
Endowments should give the university a greater (financial) independence by reducing the 
reliance on government grants, tuition and donations. Universities often rely on donations, 
which gives the donors kind of a right of co-determination and so they intervene in the day-
to-day business of the university. The other possibility is a heavy reliance on tuition, which 
makes the university vulnerable in case of changing trends, as they have to attract enough 
students to their university.  
 
Endowment funds should support the university with stability; the financial stability gives 
the university the possibility of spending more money on superior teaching and research 
environment. The university has so the possibility of spending resources to operation budgets 
and as the spending policy at Yale is clear defined, the university can plan in advance about 
the money available.  
 
Endowment funds should ease educational quality, i.e. establishing a superior educational 
environment. The income of an endowment attracts better scholars, it provides superior 
facilities and it is pioneering research. According to David Swensen there is a high 
correlation of endowment size and institutional quality (the study relies on unpublished 
research by the Yale Investment Office). Universities with better-endowed organisations are 
scored higher in the U.S. News and World Report rankings.  
 
Summarising, the endowment funds provide a good possibility for the university to gain 
financial stability and independence and it facilitates educational excellence.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
90 cp. Swensen (2009), page 9 et seqq.  
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6.2. Investment philosophy91  
The investment philosophy of an investor defines his approach how to generate portfolio 
returns, by describing the most fundamental facts affecting the investment process. Generally 
how one can create investment returns can be subdivided in three parts, namely asset 
allocation return, market timing return (i.e. short-run deviation from the long-run target 
policy) and the security selection return (which I also described in the first part of the paper). 
It is the task of the portfolio management to maximize these returns, whereas the first step is 
to determine the portfolio asset allocation.  
 
The role of asset allocation  
Many investors say that the operative point of achieving high investment returns is the asset 
allocation. In the first part of my paper I state contrary arguments and also David Swensen 
argues with a study of Ibbotson and Kapplan (2000): "on average, policy accounted for a 
little more than all of total return"92 … "approximately 90 percent of the variability of a 
fund's return across time is explained by the variability of policy returns"93.  
According to David Swensen it can be described as the following issue in institutional 
portfolio management: Portfolio managers usually hold more than one position in their 
portfolio and they do not favour applying aggressive trading strategies. They try to build-up 
broadly diversified portfolios and they avoid the appliance of market timing (i.e. the 
deviation from the long-run strategy). As they blank out the market timing return and the 
security selection return, the greatest part of the return has to be the asset allocation 
component.  
It is obvious that the asset allocation decision plays a central role in the whole portfolio 
management investment process, nevertheless in the Yale endowment fund the two other 
components of the return are not neglected. As for example when talking about deviating in 
the short run from the long-run strategy, e.g. risk control requires to rebalance the portfolio 
regularly, so that the primary goals of the portfolio can be ensured.  
 
The Yale endowment investment policy is combining informed market judgment with 
academic theory. The theoretic part is based on the mean-variance analysis from Harry 
Markowitz and James Tobin, who both worked on these topics at the Yale Cowles 
                                                 
91 cp. Swensen (2009), page 50 et seqq.  
92 cp. Swensen (2009), page 51 and Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000), page 32  
93 cp. Swensen (2009), page 51 and Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000), page 29  
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Foundation. This theoretic analysis is combining expected returns, the variance and also the 
covariance of the different securities. They are using the mean-variance analysis for risk and 
return approximations among the different security possibilities.94  
It is a clear fact that fund managers try to increase their success by focusing on inefficient 
markets, as they have a high return potential. Furthermore one can gain from high dividends 
in illiquid investments, whereas this is only the right way for long-term investors and one has 
to keep in mind that investments in illiquid market is not a business for everyone. As 
university endowments have a de facto infinite investment horizon, this fact is also part of 
the Yale endowment investment philosophy.  
An important task is to determine the different asset classes and also the target portfolio 
weights, which is definitely not the easiest part as asset class definitions are quite subjective 
and the distinctions are not that easy to find. Combining the quantitative analysis and the 
market judgment, outcomes the asset allocation.95  
 
                                                 
94 cp. The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 5 
95 cp. The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 5 
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7. Yale's asset allocation  
 
In the following table one can see the actual and the target asset allocation for the Yale 
endowment fund (for the year 2009 the data is not yet available):  
Asset class June 2008 actual  June 2008 target  Educational 
Institution Mean 
Absolute Return 25.1% 21.0% 21.7% 
Domestic Equity 10.1% 10.0% 21.7% 
Fixed Income  4.0% 4.0% 12.1% 
Foreign Equity  15.2% 15.0% 20.3% 
Private Equity  20.2% 21.0% 8.6% 
Real Assets  29.3% 29.0% 13.7% 
Cash -3.9% 0.0% 1.9% 
 Figure 15: Yale asset allocation 200896 
 
As one can see, the Yale asset allocation has a large amount in alternative assets. However, 
by overweighting one asset class one creates extraordinary risk to the portfolio, the key to 
success is diversification, i.e. with diversification the Yale endowment management is 
creating a more efficient portfolio at a given risk-level. This point is executed in Yale with 
the theoretical framework of Harry Markowitz and James Tobin. According to Markowitz 
diversification gives the investor kind of a "free lunch", that means that one can reduce the 
risk of the portfolio without reducing the expected return.97  
 
Worth mentioning is that Yale enjoys several advantages that other investors do not have, 
like the Yale endowment fund has tax-exempt status, what allows them to do frequent 
trading activities without tax influence on the gains (i.e. capital gains tax). Furthermore a 
large sophisticated investment team manages the fund on a day-to-day basis, giving them the 
possibility of a real-time rebalancing activity.98  
 
                                                 
96 cp. The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 5 and page 14  
97 cp. Swensen (2009), page 59  
98 cp. Swensen (2009), page 69 et seq.  
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Over the past decades the asset allocation changed from dependence to domestic marketable 
securities to non-traditional (alternative) assets. In the following figure one can see the 
changes in asset allocation of Yale from 1900 till 2000.  
 
 
 Figure 16: Yale's asset allocation from 1900 till 2000 99 
 
Whereas in the 80ies about three quarter of the portfolio consisted of US stocks, bonds and 
cash, nowadays the target allocation for domestic marketable securities is only 14% and the 
other 86% stand for foreign equity, private equity, absolute return and real assets. The huge 
target allocations to alternative asset classes result from their high return potential and the 
possibility of bringing diversification to the portfolio. It is surprising that the rather 
traditional portfolio in history had higher volatility; the portfolio today has higher return 
expectations at lower volatility, which can be attributed to the less efficient pricing of 
alternative assets. A further important point is the long investment horizon of university 
endowment funds, as also described in the first part of my paper. Due to the long investment 
horizon the Yale endowment fund has the possibility of better exploiting illiquid and less 
efficient markets (as leveraged buyouts, venture capital, real estate or commodities).100  
 
                                                 
99 The Yale Endowment annual report 2000, page 46 
100 cp. The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 6  
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7.1. Absolute return101  
In July 1990, the Yale university endowment fund became the first institutional investor that 
followed a strategy with absolute return as a separate asset class (at that time with a target 
allocation of 15%, whereas in 2008 the actual allocation to absolute return rose to about 
25%).  
About one half of the Yale endowment fund portfolio is committed to event-driven strategies 
relying on specific corporate events, as for example spin-offs, mergers or bankruptcy for 
achieving the target price. The second half of the portfolio achieves to the value-driven 
strategy, like hedged positions in assets or securities deviating from their underlying value. 
 
The target allocation for absolute return is in Yale now 21%, which lies insignificantly below 
the average allocation from educational institutions (with 21.7%). According to Yale, 
absolute return strategies achieve a real return of 6.0% with a volatility of about 15.0% for 
the value-driven strategies and about 10.0% volatility for event-driven strategies. Over the 
past years absolute return investments achieved returns that are mostly independent from the 
overall market moves (i.e. absolute return shows a low correlation to domestic bond and 
stock markets), which is an advantage in insecure market situation.  
 
Part of the Yale investment strategy is the alignment of interests between the investment 
manager and the investor. For this reason the absolute return asset class is structured with 
hurdle rates, performance-related incentive fees and clawback positions. Furthermore Yale 
invests considerable sums alongside Yale, what enables them to avoid the drawbacks of the 
principal-agency relationship.  
 
                                                 
101 cp. The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 8  
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7.2. Domestic equity102  
Domestic equity is usually overbalanced in the typical US institutional portfolio, as domestic 
equity stands for a large, liquid and well-researched market. Whereas the average university 
endowment fund invests about 22% in domestic equity, Yale has a target allocation of only 
10% (which has been drastically reduced compared to the asset allocation 30 years ago). 
Although the domestic equity market is well-researched and efficient, the Yale endowment 
fund tries to outperform their benchmark, the Wilshire 5000 Index, with active management 
by a few percentage points annually. 
 
In the following table one can see the dispersion of active management returns, which 
identifies the ability of maximizing the return of the security selection ability.  
 
Asset Class First Quartile Median Third Quartile Range 
US fixed income  7.4% 7.1% 0.5% 6.9% 
US equity 12.1% 11.2% 1.9% 10.2% 
International equity  10.5% 9.0% 4.0% 6.5% 
US small-capitalization equity  16.1% 14.0% 4.8% 11.3% 
Absolute return 15.6% 12.5% 7.1% 8.5% 
Real estate 17.6% 12.0% 9.2% 8.4% 
Leveraged buyouts 13.3% 8.0% 13.7% -0.4% 
Venture capital 28.7% -1.4% 43.2% -14.5% 
Table 13: Dispersion of active management returns103  
Asset returns by quartile, ten years ending on June 30, 2005.104  
 
As the security selection is the key point for outperforming in the domestic equity market, 
Yale prefers portfolio managers with "exceptional bottom-up fundamental research 
capabilities". The managers are trying to find stocks that are cheap in relation to some 
indicators, like for example the book value, earnings or cash flow. For Yale it is important 
that the portfolio managers have a high integrity, a proper investment philosophy, strong 
                                                 
102 cp. The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 8 et seqq.  
103 cp. Swensen (2009), page 74  
104 Sources: Data for marketable securities are from Russell/Mellon. The absolute return, real estate, leveraged 
buyout and venture capital data are from Cambridge Associates. Real estate, leveraged buyout and venture 
capital data represent returns on funds formed between 1995 and 1999, excluding more recent funds so that 
immature investments will not bias results downward.  
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historical success, excellent organizations and also very important are long-lasting, 
competitive advantages.  
 
7.3. Fixed income105  
The fixed income asset class is characteristic for stable income flows as it provides a higher 
sureness of nominal cash flows. Fixed income products show a low covariance to the other 
asset classes that are integrated in the endowment funds, so it is used amongst others as 
hedge against financial crisis or deflation. The educational mean for fixed income and cash 
lies at 14.0%, while Yale has a target allocation from only 4.0%. According to Yale the 
bonds have an expected real return of 2.0% with a volatility of 10.0%, using the Lehman 
Brothers 1-5 Year U.S. Treasury Index as portfolio benchmark.  
 
The Yale endowment fund is definitely not that attracted to fixed income products as some 
other universities are, as the fixed income asset class has the lowest historical (and expected) 
returns from all asset classes in the portfolio. Furthermore it is already known that the 
government bond market is the most efficiently priced market, which does not offer many 
possibilities to beat the market. The Yale endowment fund manages the endowment bonds 
internally and not by external managers, as they are kind of sceptic against active fixed 
income strategies and a structured bond portfolio is part of their investment philosophy. 
They are adding consistently value to their bond portfolio, although they dislike market 
timing strategies, credit risk and call options. 
 
7.4. Foreign equity106  
The foreign equity market gives the portfolio the possibility of a broad diversification to the 
global economy. Especially the emerging markets are presenting an attractive opportunity 
for high excess returns; with their rapidly growing economy they show according to Yale an 
expected real return of 8.0% at a risk level of 25.0%. By contrast, the developed equity 
market has an expected real return of 6.0% with a risk level of 20.0%.  
 
With their active portfolio management strategy, Yale has a target allocation to foreign 
equity of 15%, which is split-up in the following three parts: Foreign equity in emerging 
                                                 
105 cp. The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 9 et seqq.  
106 cp. The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 12  
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markets of 5.0%, foreign equity in developed countries of 6.0% and 4.0% are targeted to 
opportunistic foreign positions, with the expectation that the assets are in markets with the 
most compelling long-term perspectives, mainly China and India. As the foreign equity asset 
class is subdivided, they use a composite benchmark, which is composed as followed:  
• Developed markets: Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Europe, 
Australasia and Far East Index  
• Emerging markets: Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Markets 
Index  
• Opportunistic investments: Higher Education Price Index plus 8 percent107  
 
As well as for domestic equity, the investment philosophy pursues also for foreign equity an 
active strategy to discover the market inefficiencies to generate returns. The approach 
concerning the portfolio management is also the same: Yale prefers for foreign equity 
managers with high bottom-up fundamental research capabilities. When Yale allocates the 
capital to their portfolio managers, the following facts are included in the decision:  
• The country allocation for the foreign equity asset class  
• The degree of confidence that Yale has in the manager and  
• The proper asset size for the applied strategy  
 
Furthermore, Yale tries to exploit the undervaluation in special countries, sectors and styles 
by distributing additional money and sometimes hiring new managers with the hope that they 
can take advantage of their specific know-how.  
 
7.5. Private equity108  
The private equity asset class offers a pretty good long-term risk-adjusted return expectation, 
which goes along with the university's investment philosophy of continuously adding value 
to the portfolio by using the full capacity of market inefficiencies. In the Yale endowment 
fund private equity comprises investments in leveraged buy-outs and venture capital. All in 
one, private equity has a target allocation of 21.0%, which lies far above the educational 
mean of 8.6%. According to Yale private equity generates a real return of 11.2%, at the 
rather high risk level of 27.7%.  
 
                                                 
107 The Higher Education Price Index for universities is comparable with the Consumer Price Index for 
households.  
108 cp. The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 13 et seqq.  
55 
David Swensen (2009) stated a quantitative model about expected return, standard deviation 
and expected growth for all asset classes. The findings are summarised in the following 
table:  
 US 
Bonds 
US 
Equity 
Developed 
Equity 
Emerging 
Equity 
Absolute 
Return 
Private 
Equity 
Real 
Assets Cash 
Expected 
return 2.0% 6.0% 6.0% 8.0% 6.0% 12.0% 6.0% 0.0% 
Standard 
deviation  10.0% 20.0% 20.0% 25.0% 10.0% 30.0% 15.0% 5.0% 
Expected 
growth 1.5% 4.1% 4.1% 5.1% 5.5% 8.1% 4.9% -0.1% 
Table 14: Expected returns for all asset classes109  
Source: Yale University Investment Office. Quantitative model inputs rely on modified risk and return 
assumptions. Model data inflation adjusted using the Higher Education Price Index.  
 
As past returns provide a good starting point for capital market assumptions, the quantitative 
model is based on the following historical data (which has been inflation adjusted by using 
the Higher Education Price Index):  
 US 
Bonds 
US 
Equity  
Developed 
Equity 
Emerging 
Equity 
Absolute 
Return 
Private 
Equity  
Real 
Assets  Cash 
Observations 80 80 36 21 17 25 25 80 
Arithmetic 
return  2.5% 10.6% 8.3% 11.9% 9.9% 12.8% 6.2% 0.7% 
Standard 
deviation 6.8% 22.4% 22.1% 30.0% 8.2% 23.1% 6.8% 4.0% 
Growth rate 2.3% 8.2% 6.1% 8.1% 9.6% 10.9% 6.0% 0.6% 
Table 15: Historical capital markets analysis110  
 
As one can see from the both tables above, private equity has the highest historical returns 
and also the highest expected returns, with the highest volatility. Private equity has with 
8.1% the highest expected growth rate among all asset classes. The Yale private equity 
program is one of the first of its kind and it is considered as among the best in the 
                                                 
109 cp. Swensen (2009), page 110  
110 cp. Swensen (2009), page 109  
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institutional investment community. Since the existence of the private equity asset class at 
Yale, the investments generated a return of 30.9% per annum.  
 
The private equity investments of Yale are focusing on partnerships with firms, which give 
emphasis to a value-added approach for investing. Firms that go along with this principle 
work usually closely with portfolio companies to create more valuable entities as first-order 
and they rely only as second-order on financial engineering for creating their investment 
returns. For the investments of Yale in the private equity sector a long-term and also a close 
relationship is important (usually also a commitment of being the first of several is included). 
Furthermore they stay away from funds sponsored by financial institutions, as they want to 
eliminate interest conflicts.  
 
7.6. Real assets111  
Real estate, oil, gas and timberland show similar characteristics namely that they are 
sensitive to inflationary forces, high and visible current cash flows and a good opportunity to 
discover and benefit from market inefficiencies. Furthermore real estate can present good 
return prospects, a good portfolio diversification and a hedge against unanticipated inflation. 
The Yale endowment fund has a target allocation for real assets of 29.3%, which lies 
significantly above the educational mean with 13.7%. According to the Yale university real 
assets generate a real return of 6.0%, at a risk level of 13.6%.  
 
For the Yale University the real assets are very important in the portfolio as they provide a 
good possibility of broad diversification and furthermore they generate good returns and they 
provide relative stability during periods of public market turmoil. Since the year 1978 Yale 
has real assets in its portfolio and they achieved on average a return of 17.6% per annum.  
 
However, real assets also have disadvantages like their illiquidity, the expensive and time-
consuming process of transactions. Those are the reasons why it is not easy for the typical 
investor to invest into real assets. Yale emphasizes again and again in their investment 
philosophy that strong and long-term partnerships between the investments office and the 
investment managers are very important to them. As Yale has a large real assets contingent 
                                                 
111 cp. The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 14  
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in their portfolio, during the last decade Yale played a critical role when it comes to the 
growth and development of more than a dozen organisations.  
 
8. Yale's performance112  
 
Over the last ten years the Yale endowment fund, the second largest endowment fund of the 
world, produced an average annual return of 11.8% (net of fees), what even outperformed 
the Harvard University. Those two universities have by far the largest endowment funds with 
together assets under management of about $ 42.3 bn (at June 30, 2009, compared to $ 60 bn 
one year before)113. Over the last ten years the Yale endowment fund added value of $ 10.5 
bn relative to its composite benchmark and even $ 13.6 bn compared to the average return of 
a broad universe of college and university endowments. However, also the Yale University 
has been hit by the financial crisis, during the financial year 2009 the Yale endowment fund 
had to forfeit 24.6% of their endowment.  
 
In the following figure one can see Yale's performance from 1998 till 2008 and how they 
outperformed their peers (starting in 1998 at $ 1,000). 
 
 
Figure 17: Yale's performance 1998-2008114  
 
                                                 
112 cp. The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 20 et seqq. and . Yale Press Release, (22nd September 
2009), "Yale University Releases Endowment Figures"  
http://opa.yale.edu/news/article.aspx?id=6899 
113 cp. 2008 NACUBO Endowment Study, © 2009 National Association of College and University Business 
Officers, All Institutions Listed by Fiscal Year 2008 Market Value of Endowment Assets with Percentage 
Change Between 2007 and 2008 Endowment Assets 
114 The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 20 
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The absolute return from Yale's portfolio produced a per annum return of 12.0% over the last 
decade, which means an outperformance of 1.5% per year compared to the One-Year 
Constant Maturity Treasury plus 6.0%. The active benchmark of hedge fund manager has 
also been outranged by 1.9% per year. In the fiscal year 2009 the absolute return portfolio 
dropped 9.1%. The following figure shows a performance split-up to the separate asset 
classes, compared to an active and a passive benchmark (from 1998 till 2008):  
 
Figure 18: Yale performance split-up 1998-2008115  
  
Asset class Active benchmark Passive benchmark 
Absolute return  CSFB/Tremont Composite 1-year Constant Maturity 
Treasury + 6.0%  
Domestic equity  Frank Russell Median Manager, 
U.S. Equity  Wilshire 5000  
Fixed income  Frank Russell Median Manager, 
Fixed Income  
Lehman Brothers 1-5 Year U.S. 
Treasury Index  
Foreign equity  Frank Russell Median Manager Composite, Foreign Equity  
Blend of MSCI EAFE Index, MSCI 
EMF Index, University Inflation  
+ 8.0%  
Private equity  Cambridge Associates Composite  University Inflation + 10.0%  
Real assets  NCREIF and Cambridge 
Associates Composite  University Inflation + 6.0 %  
Table 16: Yale's active and passive benchmarks116  
 
                                                 
115 The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 21  
116 cp. The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 21  
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The last table shows the benchmarks used by the Yale endowment fund and also illustrated 
in the performance split-up graph. As one can see the outperformance in the private equity 
asset class is the highest as private equity earned over the last ten years on average 35.9% 
per annum and the benchmark, the University inflation index plus 10% earned on average 
14.2%. The private equity asset class exists since 1973 in the Yale endowment fund portfolio 
and since then the average annual return is 30.9%. In the fiscal year 2009 the private equity 
asset class declined by 24.3%.  
 
The domestic equity asset class returned for the last 10 years (ending in June 2008) a per 
annum return of 11.1%, whereas the Russell Median manager benchmark achieved a return 
of 6.6% p.a. According to the Yale endowment managers these above average returns were 
achieved through a high security selection ability. Also domestic equity was hit by the crisis 
and declined by 18.6% during the fiscal year 2009.  
 
As already mentioned before, the fixed income part of the Yale endowment fund is managed 
by internal managers and they achieved over the last decade an annualized return of 6.2%, 
which means also an outperformance of their active and passive benchmark. According to 
the Yale University they achieved the superior returns because of clever security selection 
and having the ability to carry out illiquid investments, to incur material credit and option 
risk. The fixed income part of the Yale portfolio was the only profitable asset class in the 
fiscal year 2009 with a return on 5.1%. Herein before mentioned, it is not easy to simply 
mimic the Yale endowment fund portfolio as for example for single investors it would not be 
that easy possible to bear that risk or simply to invest in illiquid assets.  
 
The foreign equity portfolio in the Yale endowment fund gained an annual return of 17.3% 
over the past ten years, outperforming the composite benchmark by 6.0% per year and the 
Russell Median Manager by 5.4%. According to the Yale University the excess return here is 
possible due to their good country allocation and the effective strategy from their active 
portfolio management. Foreign developed equities produced a loss of 14.4% during fiscal 
year 2009 and foreign emerging markets produced an even greater loss of 19.2%. Although 
the return was negative, the Yale University outperformed the benchmarks.  
 
The last asset class are real assets; they achieved an annualized return of 19.4% over the last 
ten years, outperforming the active benchmark by 7.0% and the passive by 9.3% per year. 
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During the fiscal year 2009 real assets had the worst performance with a loss of 33.9% due 
to the existing market turmoil. According to the Yale endowment management, the excess 
return here is usually possible due to successful detection and exploitation of market 
inefficiencies and also the contemporary pursuit of investment strategies.  
 
9. Yale's spending policy117  
 
The spending policy of a university defines the compromise between how much money will 
be reinvested in the assets from the endowment fund and how much will be used for current 
operations. It is important that the spending policy is applied continuously and without 
deviations as otherwise the spending policy would not have any sense, that means that the 
spending rate will not be affected by the financial crisis and the university can be sure about 
their future cash flows.  
 
The target spending rate of the Yale university stands on June 2008 at 5.25%. The Yale 
university applies a smoothing rule, which says that the endowment spending in a year is 
80% of the previous year's spending and 20% of the targeted long-term spending rate is used 
to the market value from two years ago. For sure the spending amount is adjusted for the 
current inflation and there is furthermore an absolute limit, which says that the spending is 
not allowed to be smaller than 4.5% and not larger than 6.0% of the endowment's inflation-
adjusted market value one year ago.  
 
In the following figure one can see the spending growth from 1950 till 2008. In the year 
1998 the operating budget in fiscal was $ 218 million, whereas it rose up to $ 850 million in 
the year 2008. The Yale university forecasted spending of $ 1.16 billion from the 
endowment in 2008, which represents 44% of revenues.  
 
                                                 
117 cp. The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 15 et seqq.  
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Figure 19: Spending growth 1950 – 2008118  
 
On the one hand the spending policy at Yale wants to eliminate large fluctuations by 
implying the previous year's spending, which helps the university to make plans about their 
budget, as over the last 20 years annual changes in spending have been only a fourth as 
volatile as annual changes in the overall endowment fund asset value. On the other hand the 
Yale university tries to adjust the spending toward a long-term target spending level, which 
says that the spending rate will be sensitive to the overall endowment market value.  
 
                                                 
 
118 The Yale Endowment annual report 2008, page 15 
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10. Conclusion: University endowment funds using the example of the Yale 
endowment fund  
 
Summarising, university endowment funds showed over the last years enviable 
performances, which many other investors tried to imitate by mimicking their asset 
allocation. As described in the first part of my paper, the asset allocation is progressive and 
always up-to-date, but there is more behind it than a successful asset allocation, so just 
mimicking the asset allocation is not all. The university endowment funds, like the Yale 
endowment, have a well-skilled investment team with excellent knowledge in security 
selection.  
 
The Yale endowment fund is the second largest endowment fund in the world with a volume 
of about $ 17 bn at the end of 2008. Although they had to cope with losses, like nearly all 
investors had to at that time during the financial crisis, the Yale endowment fund showed 
impressive returns in the past and in my opinion, they will also do so in the future. During 
the financial year 2009 the Yale endowment fund produced a negative return of 24.6%, 
however over the last 10 years they achieved a return of on average 11.8% per annum.  
 
The Yale endowment fund has a well-thought-out investment philosophy and a progressive 
asset allocation with exposures to multiple asset classes. Not for nothing the asset allocation 
of the Yale endowment fund is copied and mimicked several times by other investors. But be 
careful, the asset allocation is not the only factor of success, there is more behind it than a 
successful asset allocation. The portfolio managers have high skills and knowledge in the 
financial sector and strategic security selection has a high proportion on their investment 
returns.  
 
The existence of endowment funds provides the universities the possibility of financial 
stability and independence from donations and governmental support. In my opinion the 
concept of financing the universities operations by an endowment fund should also be 
distributed in Europe.  
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English Abstract  
 
University endowment funds present the possibility for the university to achieve stable 
investment returns for attaining financial stability and independence. Especially the largest 
endowment funds like Yale and Harvard have a progressive asset allocation to alternative 
asset classes and they have the status as role-model to other investors. The universities 
achieved over the last years mostly double-digit returns at much lower volatility than other 
investors. The secret of their success is not as easy to describe as someone might think. It is 
obvious that the asset allocation is part of their good investment returns, but there is more 
behind it than a modern asset allocation. The universities' portfolio managers have a high 
knowledge concerning financial markets and so they know what securities to choose (i.e. the 
security selection return). Mimicking the asset allocation by simply creating an index-
tracking portfolio should be taken out with a pinch of salt. In the second part university 
endowment funds will be discussed using the example of the Yale university.  
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Deutscher Abstract  
 
Universitätsfonds repräsentieren die Möglichkeit für Universitäten stabile Investmenterträge 
zu erhalten und somit finanzielle Unabhängigkeit zu erreichen. Speziell die zwei größten 
Universitätsfonds der Welt, die der Yale und Harvard Universität, haben eine sehr 
fortschrittliche Asset Allokation durch ihr Exposure zu alternativen Anlageklassen. Durch 
ihre Asset Allokation haben die Universitätsfonds Yale und Harvard die Rolle als Vorbild 
für andere Investoren erhalten. Sie haben in den letzten Jahren meist zweistellige Renditen 
erzielt, bei niedrigerer Volatilität als das klassische 50% Aktien und 50% Anleihen Portfolio.  
 
Das Geheimnis ihres Erfolges ist nicht so leicht zu beschreiben, wie man auf den ersten 
Blick denkt. Die Asset Allokation hat natürlich einen großen Anteil daran, jedoch ist sie 
nicht alleine ausschlaggebend für so erfolgreiche Investments. Vielmehr ist es der erste 
Schritt in die richtige Richtung. Die Portfolio Managers der Universitätsfonds habe ein 
beträchtliches Wissen was die Finanzmärkte betrifft, seien es jetzt interne oder externe 
Portfolio Manager; sie wissen genau welche Einzeltitel sie auswählen müssen. Viele 
Investoren versuchen die Asset Allokation der Universitäten Yale und Harvard zu kopieren, 
dies sollte jedoch mit Vorsicht genossen werden.  
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